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DEBATE WITHIN AND DEBATE WITHOUT:
NEPA AND THE REDEFINITION OF
THE "PRUDENT MAN" RULE
SALLY K. FAIRFAX* and BARBARA T. ANDREWS**
Public assessment of the bureaucracy is subject to an ebb and flow
similar to that observed in necktie widths. During the New Deal era,
public estimation of government agencies was quite positive. In the
mid-1940s it was possible for Paul Appleby, a renowned and insight-
ful student of public administration, to dedicate his major treatise on
the subject to "Bill Bureaucrat."' Recently, the residuum of Water-
gate and the Vietnam War has fostered a less positive view of govern-
ment, and "bureaucrat" has become a pejorative term. This concept
of executive agencies has given rise to the assumption that reform
must be forced on reluctant if not incompetent administrators. In
the area of environmental policy, this idea has been fueled by judicial
elaboration of the environmental impact statement (EIS) require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 Since the
1971 Calvert Cliffs decision,3 scholars and citizens alike have praised
the EIS, and the NEPA process has become a dominant strategy of
the environmental movement. The evolution of NEPA litigation as a
major vehicle of administrative reform coincided with the antigovern-
ment mood of the early 1970s and served, on balance, to pit the
critics on the outside against the "untrustworthy" bureaucrats
within.
Few observers would dispute that citizen-watchdog tactics have
promoted agencies' awareness of environmental issues, prodded un-
reasonably resistant government officials, and contributed to im-
proved protection of the environment. This concentration on forcing
reform from outside the agencies may, however, unnecessarily re-
strict the efforts of the environmental movement. Uncomplicated
advocacy provides strength for reformers; it may, however, weaken
their cause by leading them to overlook the complex character of
debate and decision making within agencies. Contrary to some re-
formers' beliefs, agencies are not monolithic or inflexible entities
*Assistant Professor, College of Natural Resources, University of California at Berkeley.
**Student, Stanford University School of Law.
1. P. APPLEBY, BIG DEMOCRACY (1945); but see Kaufman, Administrative Decentral-
ization and Political Power, 29 PUB. AD. REV. 3 n. 1 (1969).
2. 42 U.S.C. § §4331-4347 (1970) (hereinafter cited as NEPA].
3. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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that defensively advocate a point of view defined by vested interests,
professional bias, or devotion to the status quo. Agencies are com-
posed of individuals and groups which, while usually hierarchically
arranged, are sensitive in varying degrees to political power within
the ranks, pressures from outside constituent groups, disciplinary
areas of expertise, and the merits of issues. Too often external re-
formers have overlooked this internal variegation, opting instead to
engage in a polarized debate which simplifies the problems. The re-
formers thereby overlook a range of imaginative potential solutions.
This paper attempts to present a more complete picture of admin-
istrative decision making than that which has dominated discussions
of environmental reform to date. It is based on a detailed examina-
tion of efforts by Department of the Interior officials to redirect the
awarding of noncompetitive or "preference right" leases for coal and
phosphate under the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act.4
Although there had been some long-standing efforts in the Office
of the Solicitor within the Department to reconsider the test for
granting preference-right leases, the debate escalated during the early
1970s when the Department found itself confronted with lease appli-
cations covering thousands of acres of federally owned land.5 The
Department was most concerned with lease applications for phos-
phate mining in Florida's Osceola National Forest and California's
Los Padres National Forest which threatened, respectively, the Flori-
dan aquifer and the Sespe sanctuary for the California condor.
In response to these concerns, the Solicitor's Office reexamined
the Mineral Leasing Act mandate that the Secretary issue a lease to
any preference-right applicant who was able to show discovery of a
"valuable deposit" of phosphate6 or "commercial quantities" of
coal.' The legal staff was by no means unanimous in its interpreta-
tion of this language, and the debate grew increasingly complicated
as it shifted from the legal forum to a Departmentwide donnybrook
among advocates of administrative precedent, political acceptability,
environmental protection, and economic analysis.
In the context of this wide-ranging and often heated discussion,
NEPA played a role which was influential, if not dispositive. Its
impact has been unfortunately overlooked in analysts' and tacticians'
preoccupation with the EIS. Section 102(1) of NEPA was urged and
4. 30 U.S.C. § § 181-287 (1970).
5. The Department was also engaged for much of the period under study in developing
the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation System (EMARS) program to regulate com-
petitive bidding on leases; see PUB. LAND NEWS March 25, 1976, at 4-5.
6. 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970).
7. 30 U.S.C. § 211(b) (1970).
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ultimately rejected as a long-sought source of authority allowing the
Secretary to deny preference-right leases on purely environmental
grounds. More importantly, however, NEPA was crucial in providing
an intellectual framework and substantive rallying point for the var-
ious reform proponents within the ongoing internal debate. NEPA
crystallized and summarized concerns, goals, attitudes, and political
forces which gave crucial weight to the arguments of the internal
reformers. Finally, in 1976, after three years of intense discussion
within the Department, the Secretary promulgated new regulations.
The new reading of the 1920 statute relied on traditional precepts of
statutory analysis, along with the priorities codified in NEPA, to
effect a major shift in federal minerals policy through a new defini-
tion of valuable deposit and commercial quantities.'
A brief review of the action-forcing, external approach to adminis-
trative reform as contrasted with the internal model provides the
context for the analysis of the commercial quantities debate. Follow-
ing this discussion, an overview of federal policy under the 1872
Mining Law9 and the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act is presented as back-
ground for understanding the details of the preference-right leasing
issue. The paper then takes a closer look at Interior's efforts to
redefine valuable deposit and commercial quantities during a period
characterized as much by a notion of energy scarcity and resource
constraints as by environmental awareness. This analysis constitutes
the basis for suggesting a modified model for administrative reform
in the context of complex resource decision-making issues.
DEBATE WITHIN VERSUS DEBATE WITHOUT:
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AS TWO MODELS IN NEED OF A MERGER
An extensive body of literature praises NEPA for a variety of
reasons.1 0 These include the suggestion that NEPA has (1) forced
the agencies to weigh environmental values in decision making and
consider alternatives to proposed action, (2) enhanced public partici-
pation in agency deliberations and planning, and (3) expanded the
citizen's standing to sue in the courts. Though some of this praise is
perhaps warranted, it is also misguided in its assumption that en-
vironmental degradation is caused by administrative agencies that are
8. 43 C.F.R. § 3520 (1977).
9. 30 U.S.C. § §521-531 (1970).
10. See, e.g., S. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973); Hanks and Hanks, An
Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizens Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L.R. 231 (1970); HILL, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT AND FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PLANNING (1977); R. LIROFF, A
NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH (1976).
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unwilling and unable to protect environmental values. Law Professor
Joseph Sax stated this premise succinctly in Defending the Environ-
ment where he wrote:
It may sadden the observer to have to conclude that administrators
have to be bludgeoned into doing their job under threat of judicial
penalties or that private citizens should have to undertake the bur-
den of effective initiatives. But facts are inexorable; they do not
become less real because we dislike them.1 1
A comment on a recent Supreme Court construction of NEPA simi-
larly concluded that the law and its action-forcing provisions are
necessary "because of doubt that agencies will act on their own to
make reforms. . . . And the first six years of NEPA experience...
have amply demonstrated agencies' resistance to change, their lack of
familiarity with environmental matters, and the fact that values as
well as technical expertise are involved."1 2
The pervasive use of the term "action forcing" to describe the
provisions of Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA exemplifies the distrust of
administrative agencies among outside reformers. The EIS has be-
come the focal point of litigation on the premise that reform requires
external pressure: action must be forced. If action is not forced,
agencies adhere to established patterns of policies, procedures, and
programs whereby they endeavor to maintain predictable relation-
ships with clientele groups which they do not want disrupted. In this
view, in brief, agencies seek stability and avoid change.! Familiar
concepts of social science inquiry into administrative behavior, in-
cluding professional bias, capture, and survival strategies, can be
observed in typical analyses which enhance the aura of the insulated
agency.' '
The antiagency component of the external reform model has been
intensified by environmental activists' reliance on the courts to inter-
pret the EIS requirements. Dreyfus and Ingram note the dysfunc-
tional aspects of court involvement in terms of the length and com-
plexity of EIS documents.' I The dominance of the courtroom's
adversarial format in early discussions of environmental reform, com-
11. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION 100 (1971).
12. 6 ENVT'L L. REP. 10164, 10167 (1976).
13. See Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation: The National Environmental
Policy Act, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 327 (1976).
14. See Sax, The Unhappy Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 248 (1973) for
a discussion of factors undermining the EIS process.
15. Dreyfus & Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and
Practice, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 258, 261 (1976).
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bined with the frequency of judicial findings that agencies had in-
deed violated the fundamental mandate of environmental protection,
fueled the polarization of the early 1970s and redoubled the appar-
ent need for externally forced reform. On balance, although opposi-
tion to the "duly constituted authorities"' 6 has been an important
aspect of the ideology of environmentalism,' 7 such attitudes are a
better indication of the nation's angry, antigovernment mood in the
late 1960s and early 1970s than an accurate assessment of the
bureaucracy.
The tendency of government agencies to avoid radical or sweeping
change is not unique to them nor does it necessarily indicate insensi-
tivity to changing public values, expectations, and preferences. Views
of the bureaucracy that focus exclusively on change avoidance are
too narrow to account for the ongoing expansion and diversification
of many agency missions. Administrative intransigence is frequently
not an effective survival strategy but rather an invitation to attack.
Agencies must be responsive if they are to maintain and enhance
their authority, programs, and budget. They respond to pressure "by
modifying existing policy or developing new ones."' 8 Almost two
decades ago, Norton Long observed that, in the American political
system, the bureaucracy "has a large share of the responsibility for
the public promotion of policy and even more in organizing the
political basis for its survival and growth."' 9 Frequently, agencies
are more than merely responsive to public pressures in order to sur-
vive; they take an entrepreneurial role, leading public opinion in
order to grow. Rourke notes wryly that agencies can be "extremely
adroit in organizing pressures upon themselves to which they seem to
be responding, but which they are in fact initiating. ' '20
These venerable insights balance the view of executive agencies
exemplified, by the external reform model and suggest additional
factors which must be weighed in considering routes to administra-
16. L. CALDWELL, S. HAYES & L. MACWHIRTER, CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT: CASE STUDIES IN POPULAR ACTION, xi (1976).
17. The tendency of environmentalists to view themselves as outsiders attempting to
force environmental values into decision-making processes is ubiquitous in the movement.
See McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L. REV.
801, 806 nn. 17-20 (1977). To some extent, "good guys" versus "bad guys" approaches to
administrative reform are validated by the extensive agency capture literature. The tendency
to oversimplify or caricature one's adversary is not, in any event, a quirk of environmental-
ists.
18. F. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 103 (1969).
19. N. LONG, THE POLITY 53 (1962).
20. F. ROURKE, supra note 18, at 17. The difference between entrepreneurial empire
building and laudable executive leadership may be in the eye of the beholder, but it deserves
attention.
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tive reform. The "internal" view anticipates differential response
within an agency to a changing environment. In addition to the
"conservers"-to use Downs' classic typology-who are seen in the
external model as the dominant or exclusive components of an
agency, there are climbers, zealots, advocates, and statesmen. 2' The
conservers and zealots who are committed to existing programs in-
deed may resist new developments. Other agency actors, however,
see the necessity and opportunity for responding to and creating
change. Modification of agency position results from the inside re-
former's successful manipulation of within-agency legitimacy and
authority in combination with real or induced external pressure.
The internal model of reform has not been totally overlooked in
environmental discussions of the last decade. Friesema and Culhane,
for example, note that the Forest Service has successfully used the
EIS process to generate sufficient pressure to justify significant re-
strictions on minerals development on the national forests.2 2 Drey-
fus and Ingram, moreover, note that NEPA as originally drafted
relied on internal reform for effectuation of new priorities. This
focus, however, was diluted in compromise that preceded enactment
of the legislation and was buried in the environmentalists' rush to the
courts in the early 1970s.23
Despite the overall preoccupation with NEPA as an external "ac-
tion forcing" mechanism, the statute contains language suggesting
that reformers on the inside can arguably justify reinterpreting and
redirecting agency programs. Section 102(1), which has been almost
unnoticed by the public and insufficiently addressed by professional
observers, states that "to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies,
regulations and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
Act."2 4 The effect of this section on existing agency mandates has
been occasionally and inconclusively debated in both Congress and
the courts and among scholars. The relevant legal issue centers on
whether or not the agencies are obliged or merely permitted to read
existing mandates in the light of NEPA's broad policy goals. Early
attempts to find in 102(1) a requirement that agencies reinterpret
statutes or base decisions on environmental factors rather than
21. A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 88 (1966).
22. Friesema & Culhane, Social Impacts, Policies, and the Environmental Impact State-
ment Process, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 350, 351 (1976); see also Wichelman,Administra-
tive Agency Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act, 16 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 263 (1976).
23. Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 15, at 258.
24. NEPA §102(1), 42 U.S.C. §4332 (1970).
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simply weigh and consider them gained some early support but later
faltered. The Calvert Cliffs decision, among the earliest and most
expansive of the NEPA decisions, raised the possibility that future
litigation might result in such an obligation.2 ' Since 1973, however,
the matter has not been pressed by the courts. Recent Supreme
Court interpretations of NEPA suggest that attempts to revive the
dormant hope will fail.2 6
While the courts seemingly will not use Section 102(1) to force
action, it is nonetheless true that, "where agencies have the dis-
cretion to shape the impact and direction of their programs, NEPA
enables them to ... implement the national environmental pol-
icy. '  It is this "enabling" aspect of NEPA which invites closer
attention to agency efforts to initiate reform in dealing with the
environmental issues within their mandates.
FEDERAL MINERALS POLICY UNDER THE 1872 MINING LAW:
THE "PRUDENT MAN" RULE AND THE MARKETABILITY TEST FOR
DETERMINING DISCOVERY OF A VALUABLE DEPOSIT
Government policy toward the mineral riches of the public do-
main was codified first in 186628 and then in the General Mining
Law of 1872,29 which remains essentially unchanged today. Al-
though the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act 3 0 created an alternative to the
1872 system for certain sedimentary deposits such as coal and phos-
phate, the administration of the newer Act has been significantly
defined by concepts and precedents set under the older statute.
Accordingly, developments in the leasing area cannot be appreciated
without some understanding of the antecedents and the evolution of
federal mining law.
From present-day perspective, the most remarkable feature of the
1872 Mining Law is its longevity. Passed in an era when the prime
goal for federally owned resources was disposal, the statute is an
anachronism in today's multiple-use framework. In contrast with the
retention and management orientation of more recent legislation, the
1872 Act was founded on two basic principles: (1) that the highest
and best use of any federal land is mineral production and (2) that
25. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
26. See Sierra Club v. Kleppe, 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1977); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1197 (1978).
27. Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, I FED. ENVT'L L. 286-89
(1974).
28. 30 U.S.C. § §43, 46 (1970).
29. 30 U.S.C. § 211(b) (1970).
30. 30 U.S.C. § § 181-287 (1970).
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private development of minerals is so obviously preferable to govern-
ment retention and management that miners should be encouraged,
not just permitted, to develop their claims; and the government
should eschew any royalty."
In accordance with these principles, the 1872 law established a
system of location whereby any interested prospector could, with a
minimum of personal expenditure, acquire rights of possession to
mineral deposits as well as title to the overlying land. As an initial
step, the prospector could stake a claim wherever minerals existed or
were likely to be found, provided the land had not been withdrawn
from the operation of the Mining Law. The prospector could assert no
rights against the federal government until proof of discovery was
made. Nevertheless, the simple rituals of staking and recording a
claim gave the prospector substantial if not complete control over
the land including the minerals beneath it and whatever surface re-
sources were needed in the development of the claim.' 2
The federal government's authority to regulate mining claims and
their impacts on surface resources is seriously restricted by the
Mining Law. The most common method for dealing with Mining Law
abuses has been to completely circumvent the statute by closing the
land to mining through classification, withdrawal, or reservation.
Classification categorizes land for a certain predominant use and
places the land under the operation of statutes appropriate to that
use. Withdrawal involves the opposite procedure: rather than assign-
ing lands to, it withdraws them from the effect of a particular statute
such as the Mining Law. Reservation is a procedure whereby lands
are withdrawn to be dedicated to a specified public use such as
national forest, park, or wildlife refuge and is frequently taken in
conjunction with a withdrawal. The Mining Law, however, may still
operate in certain reservations, such as national forests, unless the
land is specifically withdrawn from mineral entry.
Contemporary developments in federal mining administration have
centered on lands entered and claimed under the 1872 law. In 1955
Congress passed the Surface Resources Act which granted the govern-
ment authority to manage timber, forage, and other surface resources
on all mining claims located after the effective date of the Act.' I A
landmark Supreme Court case in 1970 decided for the first time that
31. See, e.g., Hagenstein, Changing an Anachronism: Congress and General Mining Law
of 1872, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 480, 481-83 (1973); Strauss, Mining Claims on Public
Lands, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 185, 187 (1974); see generally, U.S. DEP'T OF THE IN-
TERIOR, REPORT OF THE MINERAL LANDS AVAILABILITY TASK FORCE (1977).
32. Strauss, supra note 31, at 187-90.
33. 30 U.S.C. § §611-615 (1970).
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the government has the authority to repossess claims on which
miners fail to perform the $100-worth of annual "assessment work"
mandated by the 1872 law.3 4 In the most recent example of in-
creased federal supervision of mining activities, the 1976 Federal
Land Policy and Management Act requires prospectors to record
their claims not just at the county courthouse under state law but
with the U.S. Bureau of Land Management as well.3 " This procedure
gives the Bureau for the first time in history basic information on the
myriad mining claims encumbering federal lands. Failure to file is
considered tantamount to abandonment of the claim. It should be
noted, however, that as significant as the Congressional and judicial
activities are, they do not alter the basic priorities of the 1872 stat-
ute.
The most significant change in the area of Mining Law administra-
tion has occurred in the evolution of the test used by the Depart-
ment of the Interior to determine whether or not a claimant has
discovered a valuable deposit of minerals. In the language of the
Mining Law, it is only "valuable mineral deposits ... [that] shall be
free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which
they are found to occupation and purchase .... - 6 It is not difficult
to see how altering the definition of a valuable deposit would affect
whether or not a claimant gained possession of the discovered min-
erals and, if desired, patent to the overlying land. In this sense, the
changing interpretation of valuable deposits "has clearly been the
instrument of policy." 3 7
Valuable deposits were first defined by an 1894 Department of
Interior decision that formulated the classic test known as the "pru-
dent man" rule. Castle vs. Womble concluded that a valuable deposit
under the 1872 Mining Law was one "of such character that a person
of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of
his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in devel-
oping a valuable mine." ' ' The prudent-man interpretation was af-
firmed and clarified in 1905 by the Supreme Court. The Court held
that a valuable deposit was one that warranted the expenditure of
the prospector's "time and money in the development of the prop-
erty." 3 9
More than 60 years later, the Supreme Court considered a case
34. Hickel v. Oilshale Corporation, 400 U.S. 48, 57 (1970).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a)(2) (1976).
36. 30 U.S.C. §22 (1970).
37. Strauss, supra note 31, at 189.
38. Castle v. Womble, 19 Interior Dec. 455 (1894).
39. Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 323 (1905).
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that arose to contest an Interior Department requirement that, for a
deposit to be valuable, it must be able to be developed and sold at a
profit. This criterion, known as the marketability test, was approved
by the Court which described it as "a logical complement to" and "a
refinement of" the prudent-man rule.4 0 The Court's basis for recog-
nizing this essential link between prudence and profitability was its
conclusion that "minerals which no prudent man will extract because
there is no demand for them at a price higher than the cost of
extraction and transportation are hardly economically valuable." ' 1
The prudent man does not develop a mine merely to break even: he
is a profit-seeking entrepreneur.
The marketability interpretation of the 1872 Mining Law has been
criticized as an unwarranted and artificial addition to the require-
ment of prudence in mineral development.4 2 Nonetheless, its adop-
tion by the Department was illustrative of the growing effort
throughout the 1960s to more aggressively challenge invalid mining
claims. During this period, the Department also fortified its contest
proceedings against claims for which patent applications had been
filed but discovery unable to be shown.' ' Ironically, while these
alterations in administrative procedure were significant and gave the
Department greater control over mining claims on federal lands, they
also resulted in fewer miners applying for patents. If miners could
stake and work their claims by merely ,following the rituals of loca-
tion, there was little point in their risking invalidation by seeking a
patent which required evaluation of their holdings under the market-
ability test.44 As a result, abuses under the Mining Law still abound
and cry for reform.
FEDERAL MINERALS POLICY UNDER THE 1920 MINERAL LEASING
ACT: SETTING THE STAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS
OVER PREFERENCE-RIGHT LEASING IN THE 1970s
In the decades following 1872, it became obvious that the Mining
Law was the source of serious difficulties in federal land manage-
ment. major problem was that prospectors fraudulently used the law
to acquire surface resources under the pretence of conducting mining
work. It was also clear that the 1872 location system was inappro-
40. Coleman v. United States, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
41. Id. at 602.
42. Reeves, The Law of Discovery Since Coleman, 21 ROCKY MTN. L. INST. PROC.
425 (1975).
43. Hochmuth, Government Administration and Attitudes in Contest and Patent Pro-
ceedings, 10 ROCKY MTN. L. INST. PROC. 467, 485 (1965); see also Strauss, supra note
31, at 211.
44. Strauss, supra note 31, at 192-93.
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priate for certain classes of nonmetalliferous minerals. In response to
these concerns, Congress passed the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act 4
which withdrew a number of minerals from the operation of the
Mining Law. The minerals placed under a new leasing system in-
cluded coal, phosphate, oil, gas, oil shale, sodium, and potassium.4 6
The leasing system differed radically from the location system of
the 1872 Mining Law. Most striking was the fact that the government
retained control over the leasing. Title to and management responsi-
bility for the surface remained in federal control. The government
decided which lands to lease and when and under what conditions to
lease them. A second major difference was the Leasing Act's provi-
sion for government revenue: lessees were required to pay rent on
the land and a royalty on any minerals produced.4
Two basic types of leases were offered under the Mineral Leasing
Act.4 In areas where the geology and nature and extent of the
mineral deposits were known, leases were offered at public auction
under a competitive bidding arrangement. For tracts that had not
been explored, prospecting permits were issued giving a permittee
exclusive right to work in an area for a two-year period. If minerals
were discovered, the permittee was free to apply for a noncompeti-
tive or so-called "preference right" lease. This noncompetitive
arrangement was designed to keep public-land mineral development
in private hands by providing an incentive to individual operators to
explore in areas of unknown mineral potential.4 9
The Mineral Leasing Act helped correct many of the abuses per-
petrated under the 1872 Mining Law. By the 1970s, however, it was
evident that leasing procedures were not operating ideally. The short-
comings of leasing were especially apparent in the case of coal which
was fast becoming a focal point of public attention in an energy-
dependent and environmentally conscious age. From one point of
view, the federal coal-leasing program was criticized for its failure to
respond to the growing energy needs of the country. At the other
end of the spectrum, environmental advocates assailed the system for
45. 30 U.S.C. § §181-287 (1970).
46. Coal was actually covered not by the 1872 Mining Law but by the Coal Lands Act of
March 3, 1873 (R. S. § § 2347-52).
47. The Mining Law produced federal revenues only by means of the insignificant fees
charged for patents. Many prospectors, however, never even bothered to carry their claims
to patent; see text accompanying note 42 supra.
48. Vlautin, To Lease or Locate, 19 ROCKY MTN. L. INST. PROC. 393, 402 (1973).
49. Note that the preference-right leasing was abolished by the Federal Coal Leasing Act
Amendments of 1975; see text accompanying note 55 infra; resolution of the commercial-
quantities debate continues nonetheless to be central to determining the status of pending
preference-right lease applications and those which might arise pursuant to prospecting
permits issued prior to passage of the act. See notes 55-58 infra and text accompanying.
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the threat which it presented to ecological values and for its failure
to protect that land from intensified mining pressures.
Those concerned with mineral production quotas pointed to statis-
tics which showed that the bulk of the nation's low-sulfur coal was
found on federal lands in the West. Although many of these lands
had been leased, the pace of production was not keeping up with
that of leasing. Between 1945 and 1970, the extent of federal
acreage under lease increased nearly tenfold; but annual coal produc-
tion declined 25 percent.5 0 From these figures, the disturbing reality
of the situation emerged: mining interests were renting thousands of
federal acres but were delaying production.
The amount and nature of the land under coal leases was also a
source of concern because the government had awarded leases with
little thought given to environmental impact. Many coal leases were
located in semiarid areas of the West where low rainfall makes re-
clamation difficult if not impossible. In 1951 the Interior Depart-
ment began adding an environmental safeguard section to leases, but
the terms were vague and not uniformly enforced.' 1 In 1969 regula-
tions were issued requiring the incorporation of environmental pro-
tection measures in exploration and mining plans.' 2 A 1972 General
Accounting Office Report found, however, that the regulations and
their enforcement were unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.5 3
Furthermore, whatever protective measures had been taken were dis-
missed as inadequate by growing numbers of environmentalists.
In the midst of growing concern over the coal program, the In-
terior Department recognized the need for a comprehensive, critical
scrutiny of its leasing procedures. In May, 1971, Interior Secretary
Rogers Morton imposed a moratorium on all coal-leasing activity.
This moratorium was extended in February, 1973, when the issuance
of coal prospecting permits was also stopped. Thereafter, leasing was
allowed only under prescribed "short term criteria" designed to keep
existing mines operating and needed fuel supplied.' ' In the mean-
time, the Department concentrated on the development of a coher-
ent coal-leasing program that could insure orderly production, pro-
tect the environment, and allow a fair-market return on coal through
an open and competitive leasing system.
50. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1977).
51. COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, LEASED AND LOST 27-28 (1974).
52. Id.
53. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATION OF
REGULATIONS FOR SURFACE EXPLORATION, MINING, AND RECLAMATION OF
PUBLIC AND INDIAN COAL LANDS (1972).
54. ENVIRONMENT REPORT, Major Revisions Likely in Federal Coal Leasing Program,
7 NAT. J. REP. 1101-03 (1975).
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Efforts to develop a new coal-leasing policy focused on a competi-
tive process which was eventually made law by the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act passed in 1976.' ' The amendments, how-
ever, did not affect "valid existing rights" that included applications
for preference-right leases filed under the old noncompetitive system.
At the time of the moratorium, approximately 190 of these applica-
tions existed which covered an estimated 9 billion tons of coal.5 6
Some of these lease applications involved underground mines and
were not of great concern to environmentalists. Other applications,
however, such as those submitted for mining in the Powder River
Basin of the Northern Great Plains region, were the source of con-
siderable controversy.' I A further problem was that, in addition to
the applications already filed, nearly 30 prospecting permits had
been issued prior to 1973 for which lease applications had yet to be
submitted.' '
Concern and controversy over preference-right lease applications
was not confined to coal, even though the coal-leasing program was
the largest of the Department's mineral-leasing programs and at-
tracted much of the criticism. The processing of applications for
phosphate deposits also was controversial, principally because of two
large mining developments that threatened to impair substantial
natural resources. The first of these controversies involved applica-
tions by the Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation and other enterprises
for preference-right leases to mine phosphate in an area covering
one-third of the Osceola National Forest in north-central Florida. In
197 1, the State of Florida brought suit against the federal govern-
ment to enjoin issuance of the leases as a violation of NEPA.5 I The
state opposed the mining operation mainly because officials feared
contamination of the Floridan aquifer which supplied water to all of
the northern peninsular portions of the state. The forest was also
valuable habitat for 11 species classified as threatened or endangered
under state and federal standards.6 0 Despite state and federal opposi-
tion to the leases, including a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
recommendation issued early in 1975 that no phosphate mining
should be allowed to take place in the area, 6' the most recent In-
55. 30 U.S.C. 4 §201 (1977 Supp.).
56. PUB. LAND NEWS, May 20, 1976, at 5-6.
57. PUB. LAND NEWS, April 6, 1978, at 1-2; but cf Sierra Club v. Kleppe, 96 S. Ct.
2718 (1977).
58. ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 54.
59. State of Florida v. Morton, No. 71-1496 (D.D.C., filed July 27, 1971).
60. Brief for Appellants, Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation v. Andrus, No. 77-1785
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
61. 5 ENVT'L L. REP. 10048 (1975).
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terior Department study of the issue concluded that the environ-
mental impacts would not be as serious as previously feared.6 2
The second phosphate mining dispute arose over a lease applica-
tion filed by the U.S. Gypsum Company in 1969. This application
was of concern because the mining was to take place in the Los
Padres National Forest, just a few miles from a California condor
sanctuary. In 1972, the State of California reacted to the situation
by petitioning the Interior Department to weigh the economic bene-
fits expected from the phosphate mining against the costs of environ-
mental damage inflicted on the condor population.6 3 As one Univer-
sity of California scholar somewhat dryly concluded, "The public
could legitimately question the wisdom of using public land for such
an endeavor as this and risking an endangered species of international
significance ... when it has not even been clearly demonstrated that
the benefits to society outweigh the costs."6 4
INTERIOR DEPARTMENT DEBATE OVER PREFERENCE-RIGHT LEASE
APPLICATIONS: FORGING THE LINKS BETWEEN THE MINING LAW,
MINERAL LEASING ACT, AND NEPA
The Los Padres and Osceola decisions, pending during the general
overhaul of the coal-leasing program, caused the Department to
scrutinize its policies for awarding preference-right leases for coal and
phosphate. While it would have been straightforward to simply deny
the lease applications on the basis of environmental unacceptability,
the situation was not to be so easily resolved. Difficulties stemmed
from the particular language of the Mineral Leasing Act, its apparent
relationship to the Mining Law, and its meaning in light of NEPA.
The process of interpreting the interrelationships between these three
statutes led to the promulgation of the 1976 commercial-quantities
regulations, but only after intense internal disagreement that revealed
the wide range of perspectives prevalent within the Department and
its component agencies and offices.
62. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, IMPACT OF POTENTIAL PHOSPHATE
MINING ON THE HYDROLOGY OF OSCEOLA NATIONAL FOREST, FLORIDA (1978).
63. In Re Revaluation of Value of Phosphate Deposits in Los Padres National Forest, 2
ENVT'L L. REP. 65198 (1972).
64. R. C. Bishop, Conservation of the California Condor in Relation to the Proposed
Phosphate Mining and Processing Operation in Los Padres National Forest 24 (July 27 and
28, 1971) (statement delivered at U.S. Department of the Interior Hearings, Ventura, Cali-
fornia). Although the California condor has attracted considerable public attention, the
Florida lease situation was probably of greater salience within the Interior Department. This
was both because the Department was at the same time considering a lease exchange which
would eliminate the condor problem and because the Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife,
and Parks was from Florida (personal communication with David E. Lindgren 2, February
23, 1979).
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The basic starting point for the debate over noncompetitive6
leasing procedures was the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act which stated
that, if a miner operating under a prospecting permit discovered
"coal in commercial quantities" or "valuable deposits of phosphate,"
then "the permittee shall be entitled to a lease ... "66 To obtain a
noncompetitive lease for sodium, sulfur, or potassium, the Mineral
Leasing Act requires not only that valuable deposits of these minerals
be discovered but that the land be "chiefly valuable therefor. ' ' 6 7
This highest-use stipulation gives Interior additional administrative
discretion that, when exercised in light of NEPA, can result in out-
right denial of an undesirable lease. The highest-use criterion is not,
however, applicable to coal or phosphate.
In the absence of a highest-use guideline, the issue of denying
noncompetitive leases for coal and phosphates presented two legal
questions: (1) did the 1920 Act, by itself or with NEPA priorities
superimposed, authorize the Secretary to deny leases outright; and, if
not, (2) how were commercial quantities of coal and valuable de-
posits of phosphate to be defined for purposes of determining that
the permittee had made a discovery which required that he "shall be
entitled to a lease . . . ?-6 8
Discretion to Deny a Lease to a Qualified Applicant
In light of the Osceola and Los Padres National Forest mining
controversies during this period of reassessment, the Secretary of the
Interior raised the direct question of whether he had any authority
to deny the leases. Resolution of this issue required interpretation of
the language of the Mineral Leasing Act to determine the nature of
the right involved in the successful permittee's application for a non-
competitive lease. Although debate over the correct interpretation of
the Act was essentially a legal question, the debate involved many
actors outside of the Office of the Solicitor. Within that Office,
however, the key arguments were fully articulated. One predominant
faction stood staunchly behind the long-standing position of the
Department that the Secretary had no discretion to refuse to issue a
lease if the proper showing of commercial quantities of valuable
65. It is common Department practice to equate the leasing terms "noncompetitive" and
"preference right," and this paper uses the two interchangeably; however, in the context of
the Mineral Leasing Act, preference right is actually a misnomer since the right involved is
interpreted by the Department as an absolute one; see text accompanying notes 70-72 infra
for further discussion of this point.
66. 30 U.S.C. § § 201(b) (coal), 211(b) (phosphate) (1970).
67. 30 U.S.C. § §262 (sodium), 272 (sulfur), 282 (potassium) (1970).
68. Id.
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deposits was made. 6 9 This interpretation relied partly on the word
"shall" in the phrase "shall be entitled to a lease," which was read to
denote a mandatory rather than a discretionary duty. Second, the
use of "entitled" seemed to signify that the permittee who made a
successful showing had an absolute right to a lease with which secre-
tarial discretion could not interfere. The no-discretion interpretation
was further bolstered by the Leasing Act language stating that the
qualified permittee was entitled "to a lease" and not, specifically, to
a "preference right lease." Since a careful perusal of the structure
and wording of the Act revealed that Congress was cognizant of the
distinction between a preferential and an absolute right to a lease
and, since Congress did not qualify "lease" with preference-right in
the sections under scrutiny, Congress must have intended the right to
be an absolute one." In addition, the no-discretion, absolute-right
interpretation corresponded with the generally accepted concept of a
guaranteed lease as a reward for a successful prospector's efforts to
discover valuable minerals.
Interestingly, the Department's traditional interpretation of the
non-competitive lease applicant's right as absolute appeared to have
been contradicted in its Departmental regulations that referred to
noncompetitive leases as preference-right leases.7 1 Their use of the
term "preference right" seemed to imply that the permittee had a
right to preferential treatment in the awarding of a lease if the Secre-
tary decided to issue one, rather than a right to the lease itself. The
Department explained that its use of the preference-right wording
was an error that did not qualify the nature of the right under
contention. 72
Opposing the Department's traditional no-discretion stance were a
few attorneys within the Solicitor's Office who took the position
that the 1920 Act gave the Secretary authority to directly deny a
lease. This view was supported in part by a 1950 Supreme Court
decision that stated, ". . . we find no grant of authority [in the Min-
eral Leasing Act] to create a private contract right that would over-
ride his [the Secretary's] continuing duty to be governed by the
public interest in deciding to lease or withhold leases." 7 Environ-
69. For a detailed account of the Department's reasoning on this issue, see Garner,
Mineral Leasing: Toward a Workable Definition of "Commercial Quantities," 47 U. COLO.
L. REV. 707 (1976).
70. Id. at 714-15.
71. 43 C.F.R. § 3520.1 (1974).
72. Office Memorandum Re/Preference Right Leases for Coal, Sodium, Phosphate, Sul-
fur, and Potassium from Deputy Solicitor Lindgren to Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Energy and Minerals 9 (Dec. 4, 1975).
73. Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621, 628 (1950).
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mental protection advocates asserted further that, even if the Secre-
tary had no discretion under the 1920 Act to withhold a lease, NEPA
provided the necessary authority to do so. Specifically, the Assistant
Solicitor for Environmental Law in the Division of General law
argued that "NEPA enables the Secretary to deny an application
filed by a prospecting permittee, even though the permittee fully
complies with the requirements set forth in the Mineral Leasing
Act." 74 This opinion was based on Section 102 of NEPA which
mandates that "to the fullest extent possible: the policies, regula-
tions, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
Act .... -7
The agitation within the Division of General Law for a more ex-
pansive interpretation of the Secretary's authority to directly deny a
lease corresponded with the Division's functions and interests as dis-
tinguished from the rest of the Solicitor's Office. The Division of
General Law included the legal staff responsible for the Department's
NEPA compliance and litigation. NEPA was the sole concern of the
Environmental Law Branch, and a broad reading of NEPA require-
ments was the basis of Branch efforts to expand its own role in
Department policy discussions. Within the Solicitor's Office, how-
ever, the NEPA-oriented contingent was directly opposed by attor-
neys in the Minerals Branch of the Division of Energy and Minerals.
The Minerals Branch agreed with more than 50 years of Department
policy and maintained that NEPA was a supplement to existing
authorities, not an alteration of them. Support for this viewpoint was
drawn from Section 105 of NEPA which states that "the policies and
goals set forth in this Act are supplementary to those set forth in the
existing authorizations of Federal agencies." The courts have inter-
preted this section to mean, in part, that observance of NEPA is not
required where "this would prevent the agency from complying with
its duties under existing authority."7 6 Because NEPA in this frame-
work became merely "an additional facet of an already existing dis-
cretion," it was powerless to upset the prevailing view that the Secre-
tary had no authority to deny a noncompetitive lease to a qualified
permittee.7 7
74. Office Memorandum Re/Mineral Leasing Act of 1920-Sec. 201(b)-Relationship to
NEPA from Assistant Solicitor to Deputy Solicitor, Environmental Law, Division of General
Law, Department of the Interior 1 (Aug. 21, 1975).
75. 42 U.S.C. § §4331-4347 (1970).
76. Office Memorandum Re/Preference Right Leases, supra note 72.
77. Office Memorandum Re/"Preference" Right Leases-Coal, Sodium, Phosphate, Sul-
fur, and Potassium from Solicitor Frizell to Undersecretary Lyons 7 (June 30, 1975).
Lindgren notes that NEPA's policies are broad but really rather flabby. Section 103 of
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The debate on the discretion issue was prolonged, but in the end
the point was resolved in favor of existing policy. Despite NEPA's
undisputed relevance to the discussion, much of the debate con-
cerned minute interpretations of statutes in which the Minerals
Branch was obviously expert. Accordingly, the views of that Branch
were taken quite seriously within the Department. Moreover, the
position advocated by the Environmental Law Branch depended to a
considerable degree "on a stretching of dicta in a number of key
NEPA cases." 7"8 In the final analysis, although environmental con-
cerns were a significant motivating factor in the attempt to reinter-
pret the Act, lawyerly concern with proper interpretation of the
language overcame the push for change advocated by attorneys with
other interests within the Solicitor's Office.
Defining "Commercial Quantities" and "Valuable Deposit"
Under the Mineral Leasing Act
Once it was conceded that the Mineral Leasing Act allowed the
Secretary no discretion to reject a successful lease application, the
Department addressed the problem of defining commercial quantities
and valuable deposits-the essence of successful discovery. Like the
discretion issue, this question was in large part a matter of statutory
interpretation. Again the Solicitor's Office was intimately involved.
However, the debate spread significantly beyond a scholarly inquiry
into legal technicalities and embraced an array of competing values
and policy concerns. The debate over the discovery test included,
therefore, a broader range of actors and alternatives than did the
argument over Secretarial discretion and demonstrates even more
vividly the intensity and diversity of intra-agency deliberation.
The disagreement over the coal and phosphate discovery test arose
because the meaning of analogous terms had never been formally
clarified under the Mineral Leasing Act. As the debate took shape,
three major alternatives emerged. The first of these based discovery
on the physical workability of the deposit; the second, on the eco-
nomic marketability of the deposit; and the third, called the social
balancing test, on the net social benefits to be gained from the
mining venture. Each of these tests had advocates within the Depart-
ment who argued on the basis of their own particular substantive
preferences, political sensitivities, and professional inclinations.
NEPA requires an analysis of statutes which might preclude full compliance with NEPA.
The Department of the Interior's report listed the Mineral Leasing Act as one of those
statutes. Lindgren, personal communication, supra note 64, at 3.
78. Id.
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Since 1920, it had been the Department's long-standing practice to
use a simple workability test to validate commercial quantities of
coal and valuable deposits of other leasable minerals. The workability
test had always been applied by the U.S. Geological Survey and
involved a relatively uncomplicated set of concepts focusing on the
physical features of the discovered deposit. A workable deposit con-
stituting a discovery and requiring issuance of a lease was, therefore,
one which exhibited "physical characteristics (depth, thickness, qual-
ity, etc.) ... such that the deposit could be mined under existing or
easily foreseeable techniques."'7 9 No attention was given to external
factors such as the costs of development and transportation or the
availability of markets.
The workability test was supported by the weight of tradition.
Moreover, the U.S. Geological Survey, being familiar with the test
and finding it well within its professional competence, argued for its
preservation. Within the Solicitor's Office, however, the Assistant
Solicitor for Minerals had been arguing for nearly 20 years that the
workability test was based on a misreading of the Mineral Leasing
Act. The same attention to statutory language which led him to
conclude that the Secretary had no discretion to deny a lease to a
successful permittee had convinced him that workability was an in-
appropriate test for discovery. Furthermore, despite the Geological
Survey's position in favor of the status quo, the upper echelons of
the Department had become increasingly uncomfortable with the
noncompetitive leasing system in general and even advocated legisla-
tion for its alteration."0 Finally, the pressure generated by the
Osceola and Los Padres environmental controversies gave impetus to
the belief that a standard more comprehensive than mere workability
was proper under the 1920 Act. NEPA was a focus in the discussion
not because Section 102(1) was legally necessary to a rereading of
the 1920 Act but because it provided a rallying point and a make-
weight for the reform advocates.
The departure from workability was supported by its view of the
critical relationship between the Mineral Leasing Act and the pru-
dent-man/marketability discovery standards developed under the
1872 Mining Law.8 1 To successfully sustain this line of reasoning,
the first question which had to be settled was whether or not the use
of the words "valuable deposit" in the Leasing Act meant the same
79. Office Memorandum Re/Administrative Feasibility of Alternate "Commercial Quan-
tities" Tests from Assistant Secretary Hughes to Secretary et al. 2 (June 16, 1975).
80. Office Memorandum Re/Preference-Right Coal Leasing from Assistant Secretary
Hughes to Solicitor 4 (Feb. 1, 1975).
81. See text accompanying notes 3742 supra.
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thing as the use of the same words in the 1872 statute. It was also
necessary to determine whether or not Congress intended a different
treatment for coal by disclaiming the more common terminology of
"valuable deposit" and instead requiring that "commercial quan-
tities" of coal be discovered. The Minerals Branch concluded on the
basis of a careful probe of the mining and mineral leasing laws and
legislative histories, as well as pertinent Department circulars and
cases, that Congress had indeed intended that a deposit valuable for
leasing be considered to be the same as a deposit valuable for loca-
tion under the 1872 system. The more difficult problem was proving
that valuable deposits and commercial quantities were equivalent
terms.8 2 Among the several sources of evidence cited to this end,
one of the most effective was Circular No. 594 on potash. This
circular, issued to implement the 1917 Act first removing potassium
from the Mining Law 8" directly connected the two terms in stating
that "the discovery of a valuable deposit of potash ... shall be
construed as the discovery of a deposit which yields commercial
potash in commercial quantities.8 4
The next step taken in the legal analysis involved association. If
valuable deposits and commercial quantities under the Leasing Act
were the same, and if they were identical in meaning to valuable
deposits under the 1872 law, then it was only logical that the pru-
dent-man/marketability rule formulated to test mining claims should
apply to the 1920 Act as well. If the marketability test was appro-
priate for leasable minerals, then all of the costs that the mining
enterprise would have to incur to develop and market the minerals
were pertinent to determining a deposit's profitability. These costs
included, among others, the costs of complying with the terms and
conditions of the noncompetitive lease.
The ingeniousness of the marketability test lay in the fact that,
although the Secretary had no authority to deny a lease once dis-
covery had been proved, he did have discretion under the Mineral
Leasing Act to set terms and conditions of the lease. Section 187 of
the Act gives the Secretary broad authority to make noncompetitive
leases subject to "such ... provisions as he may deem necessary ...
for the protection of the interests of the United States ... and for
the safeguarding of the public welfare."'8  Thus, although the Secre-
tary could not directly refuse to issue a lease, he could express his
reservations about doing so in lease stipulations. Under a market-
82. See Garner, supra note 69.
83. Act of October 2, 1917, 62 Stat. 297 (repealed 1927).
84. Potash Guidelines, 594 DEP'T INTERIOR CIRCULAR 338 (1917).
85. 30 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
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ability test, these lease terms would count as costs which could then
result in the lease being denied on the grounds that it failed to pass
the discovery test. In short, the marketability test had the potential
of being nearly as effective an administrative tool as outright discre-
tion to deny a lease.
Because the Secretary had always had power under Section 187 of
the Mineral Leasing Act to set lease stipulations in the public inter-
est, NEPA language was not strictly necessary to establish the Secre-
tary's authority to condition leases for environmental protection pur-
poses. However, NEPA's mere existence influenced the measures
which the Secretary might consider under Section 187 in response to
changing perceptions of the public interest and welfare. While safe-
guarding the environment was not a paramount public interest issue
in 1920, the passage of NEPA made clear that it had become so by
1970. Although NEPA, as the Solicitor's Office concluded in 1975,
did "not allow the Secretary to refuse to issue a lease to a prospec-
tive permittee who had made a discovery . . . ," it did "guide the
Secretary in choosing lease terms." 8 6 Under this rationale, the con-
cept of marketability was critical. Marketability incorporated lease
terms directly into the discovery test, thereby according substantial
weight to environmental factors in the decision of whether or not to
award a coal or phosphate preference-right lease.
While the Geological Survey held to workability and minerals law-
yers in the Solicitor's Office insisted on the statutory correctness of
marketability, a third group joined the debate from a different sector
of the Department. Economists in the Office of Policy Analysis,
under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary for Program Devel-
opment and Budget, maintained that the appropriate definition of
the discovery test was neither a geological nor a legal issue but was a
broader question of public policy. The policy analysts were most
concerned with convincing marketability proponents that their test
did not go far enough. In its place the analysts advocated an eco-
nomic approach. They concluded in light of the NEPA mandates that
discovery required a "social balancing" test, going beyond the profit-
ability of the individual deposit to weigh the benefits and costs to
society of the proposed mining activity.' 7
The social-balancing argument was based on the premise that the
lease stipulations that the Secretary was allowed to set in the public
interest under Section 187 of the 1920 Act were, by the very defini-
86. Office Memorandum Re/Preference Right Leases, supra note 72, at 23.
87. The authors are indebted to William Moffat, former Director of the Office of Policy
Analysis, for providing the basis for much of the discussion that follows regarding the
social-balancing option.
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tion of the "public interest," restricted to terms whose benefits ex-
ceeded their costs. A stipulation set to protect some aspect of the
environment, therefore, could be "in the public interest" only if the
cost of complying with it did not exceed the value of the damage
which it was intended to mitigate. In view of this restriction on
stipulations, social-balancing advocates feared that, under a market-
ability test, leases could be certified as profitable to the individual
firm but still be responsible for environmental damage left unac-
counted for. To expand the marketability test to ascertain the "true"
profitability of a lease, the social-balancing test was devised. The test
modifies what Interior recognizes as a firm's profit by considering
not only internal costs of complying with the stipulations but also
the external costs of the unmitigated environmental damage.
The intradepartmental debate between marketability and social
balancing was largely a conflict between lawyers on the one hand and
economists on the other. The lawyers were most concerned with
being able to reach fair, consistent, and reasonable decisions on indi-
vidual leases. To make such decisions required, from their perspec-
tive, the promulgation of an easily ascertainable standard or thresh-
old that demarcated the line between cases where leases could be
granted and cases where they could not. They believed marketability
provided such a standard. Social balancing was objectionable because
it would demand tenuous valuations of seemingly immeasurable costs
and benefits, invite arbitrary and capricious decision making, and be
difficult for the U.S. Geological Survey to administer.
Perhaps more importantly, the marketability advocates were con-
vinced that the social-balancing test went beyond the mandate of the
Mineral Leasing Act. Focusing on net social benefits rather than on
the profitability of the individual mining venture was tantamount in
the lawyers' viewpoint to "changing the meaning of the term valu-
able deposit (or commercial quantities)."' Because "changing the
meaning of valuable deposit would clearly amend the Mineral Leasing
Act," the social-balancing test and its reliance on NEPA "must be
rejected." 8 9 Marketability, in contrast, was legally authorized since
it simply "added a new [discovery] test," thereby "supplementing"
but not amending the 1920 Act.9 0
While the legal staff voiced a discomfort with social balancing
which appeared to have both subjective and objective components,
the policy analysts were equally ill at ease with the lawyers' strict
insistence on private profit-oriented marketability. To the policy
88. Office Memorandum Re/Prefernce Right Leases, supra note 72, at 23 n. 1.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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analysts, a standard which ignored the costs to society of unmiti-
gated environmental damage was necessarily an incomplete one.
Under marketability, a firm would never account for stipulations
whose costs outweighed benefits in terms of environmental values
preserved-a condition that excluded considering (1) low-probability
risks, (2) moderate damage that was expensive to mitigate, and (3)
substantial and fairly predictable harms that mining under any terms
would be likely to incur. Social balancing appealed to the economist
since it internalized these costs within a broadened marketability
framework and allowed the decisionmaker to weigh more realistically
the full spectrum of benefits and costs involved. What the test lacked
in terms of legally sought-after lines it gained in flexibility and the
desirability of proper cost accounting. Furthermore, the test was by
no means unadministerable; data requirements and other obstacles in
exercising dependable judgment were not insurmountable. In 1975
the Office of Policy Analysis experimentally applied social balancing
along with the workability and marketability tests to a pending coal
preference-right lease application and concluded that "the only
major difference between the marketability and overall [social] bal-
ance tests lies in what information is used, not in how much extra
information is needed or in the difficulty of gathering it." 9 '
While the policy analysts maintained that their economic rationale
escaped the lawyers and the lawyers contended that social balancing
went beyond the law, the two positions were not that far apart in
either practical effect or environmental emphasis. The marketability
advocates believed that their test gave clout to environmental con-
siderations by calculating protective lease conditions in a deposit's
profitability. Social balancers criticized this approach as inadequate,
but their skepticism could have been partly due to an overly restric-
tive interpretation of the public-interest limitation on setting lease
terms. As already noted, the social balancers interpreted the public
interest in economic terms and concluded that lease terms could not
be imposed unless benefits exceeded costs of compliance. The law-
yers, however, viewed the public-interest limitation as one requiring
that the lease terms be reasonable. Reasonableness meant simply that
the Secretary
must not be arbitrary and capricious, but as long as there is a reason-
able basis for the terms and provisions which he proposes, and they
are not in conflict with other requirements of the statutes, they are
acceptable. ... If the Secretary, without being arbitrary or capri-
cious, determines that a provision is needed ... he must include it,
91. Office Memorandum Re/Preference-Right Coal Leasing, supra note 80, at 8.
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and the fact that it may render mining under the lease uneconomic is
immaterial. 9 2
This broader legal view of the public interest would seem to indi-
cate that the marketability test encompassed a greater range of en-
vironmentally protective lease terms than that for which its econo-
mist critics gave it credit. Beyond the scope of the lease terms,
however, the social balancers were correct in maintaining that, in
certain critical cases-notably the mining proposed for the Osceola
and Los Padres National Forests-a lease application threatening
irreparable environmental harm could pass the marketability test.
Marketability would be powerless to screen out such applications
since the only lease terms that could be set to avoid the damage-if
terms could be specified at all-would amount to banning mining
altogether.
Because the overall effect of social balancing was viewed within
the Department as the most environmentally oriented, social-
balancing proponents tried to enlist the support of Interior agencies
which they viewed as strongly committed to the environmental
movement-the National Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice.9 Such support was not forthcoming, apparently for several
reasons. Both the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service had
relatively minimal contact with mineral leasing issues, and neither
was willing to enter the debate to protect federal lands not under
their jurisdiction. Environmental movement or no, the two agencies
were not willing to expend effort on issues that did not concern
them. The Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks did, how-
ever, advocate social balancing in discussions with the Secretary. 94
It is noteworthy that the social balancers did not consider the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) as a potential ally. Even though
the BLM administers the leases, once awarded, there was no attempt
by the economists to build support within the Bureau for social
balancing. The Bureau was then attempting to shed its prodevelop-
ment image in favor of a multiple-use profile, but the social balancers
believed that the Bureau was too program oriented to participate in a
policy debate.
The social balancing economists' view of the Bureau notwithstand-
ing, some secretarial-level decision-makers perceived the Bureau not
only as having a clear position on the issue but as advocating vigor-
ously in favor of a workability test. The Assistant Secretary for Land
92. Office Memorandum Re/Preference Right Leases, supra note 72, at 23.
93. See note 87 supra.
94. Lindgren, personal communication, supra note 64, at 5.
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and Water, the "Bureau's Assistant Secretary," initially favored
workability but ultimately supported the marketability test. This
confusion may have discouraged the social balancers from approach-
ing the Bureau in their quest for allies. However, the policy analysts'
assumption that the Park Service and not the BLM would be con-
cerned with the issue, and their failure to note the BLM's activities in
opposition to their efforts, is an interesting reflection of secretarial-
level isolation from Bureau-level concerns. 9 I
The outcome of the three-sided debate between workability, mar-
ketability, and social balancing was a set of regulations issued in
final form in May, 1976. 9 6 The regulations reflected the middle
ground of marketability which, in the end, prevailed. They accord-
ingly required that a preferenceright lease applicant prove discovery
as measured by the perceptions of the prudent man and "a reason-
able expectation that his revenues from the sale of the mineral will
exceed his costs of developing the mine, and extracting, removing,
and marketing the mineral." 9"' Expenditures made to protect the
environment would not be tabulated separately but would be added
with other pertinent items to achieve a final figure of costs to the
mining enterprise. Then, simply, if "the cost of mining exceeds the
value of the deposit the lease application will be denied."9 8
Although marketability occupied the middle ground in the debate,
it departed significantly from the workability practice of the past,
particularly in its requirement that lease terms be set before rather
than after the issuance of a lease. Social balancing at one end of the
spectrum and workability at the other placed marketability in the
position of a reasonable compromise between opposing factions
within the Department. Clearly, all three points of view played a vital
role in the decision-making process.
The outcome, far from being predetermined, was shaped by the
concepts, tools, and data familiar to the positions and professions
involved. The geologists in the Survey favored the familiar test that
they felt competent to administer. The lawyers of the Minerals
Branch opposed that position as a misreading of the 1920 Act and
95. Interestingly, the Deputy Solicitor, unlike the Director of the Office of Policy An-
alysis, saw the Geological Survey as playing a relatively insignificant role in the debate. The
Deputy Solicitor attributed to the Geological Survey the same reluctance to make policy
recommendations that the Director of Policy Analysis attributed to the BLM. The Deputy
Solicitor generally attached less significance to the staff-level activities than did other actors
in the debate. Id. at 4-5. These differing perceptions of the debate underscore the impor-
tance of attending to the variegations of the bureaucracy in attempting to reform it.
96. 41 Fed. Reg. 18845, 18847 (May 6 and 7, 1976) (codified in 43 C.F.R. 3520).
97. 43 C.F.R. § 3520.1-1 (1977).
98. 41 Fed. Reg. 18845, 18847 (May 6 and 7, 1976) (codified in 43 C.F.R. 3520).
July 19791
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
rejected the social-balancing test with which the economists in the
Office of Policy Analysis were most professionally comfortable. Sub-
stantively, the array of positions spanned the gamut from least to
most protective of the environment. However, "for" or "against" the
environment is inadequate as an explanation for the motivations of
participating players; a rich variety of groups and concerns shared in
the debate. It is this reality that calls into question the simplistic
good-guys and bad-guys analysis inherent in much of the external
approach to administrative reform.
THE MINERAL-LEASING MARKETABILITY TEST IN A PUBLIC POLICY
FORUM: DEBATE WITHIN AND DEBATE WITHOUT
In general, the debate over the definition of commercial quantities
and valuable deposits was too complex and legalistic to become a
focus of popular concern. Nevertheless, the issues involved were not
aired solely within the Department of the Interior. Agency constit-
uencies and their representatives in Congress constituted a concerned
and frequently vocal adjunct to the internal debate. Internal re-
formers invoked the influence and needs of their external counter-
parts. Thus, while the external reform model is inadequate to
describe the reform of the discovery test, so too is the internal
model.
In the particular instance of NEPA and its impact on noncompeti-
tive mineral leasing, the positions within the Interior Department
were shaped and challenged by a number of outside concerns. These
included the mining industry, environmental groups, and the Carter
Administration, which assumed office in 1977 with an explicitly
cultivated proenvironment image.
The mining industry had operated for many years under the
Department's traditional workability test. It was to be expected that
industry would challenge the Department's switch to a marketability
standard that included the costs of complying with a lease. When the
new regulations were proposed in January, 1976, Atlantic Richfield
Company offered the general comment characteristic of the mining
industry reaction: "The imposition of a standard established under
the Mining Law of 1872, which deals with locatable rather than
leasable minerals, to a definition of 'commercial quantities' under the
1920 Mineral Leasing Act, is ill advised." 9 9
Industry challenge to the commercial-quantities regulations con-
99. Letter from H. E. Bond, Atlantic Richfield Co., to Director, U.S. Bureau of Land
Management, Re/Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Concerning Prospecting Permittees (March
10, 1976).
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centrated less on the legal soundness of the marketability test than
on its retroactive application to deposits for which leases had not yet
been issued but which had been certified as valuable under the old
workability test. About one-half of the pending applications for non-
competitive phosphate leases (including those of Kerr-McGee and
U.S. Gypsum) fell into this interim category as did approximately
one-third of the pending applications for coal.1 00 Industry objec-
tions to retroactive application thus constituted a significant threat
to the scope and effectiveness of the 1976 regulations.
In one of the first cases heard on this issue, Kerr-McGee Chemical
Corporation filed suit to force the Department to issue a lease for
valuable deposits of phosphates discovered in Florida. The district
court in 1976 issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary to
issue the Osceola phosphate leases. This order was based on the
undisputed fact that the U.S. Geological Survey had certified that a
valuable deposit had been discovered. The district court noted that
the Department had delayed seven years in processing the lease and
did not find convincing the Department's plea that it was in the
process of preparing new regulations on the issue. The Court of
Appeals reversed, noting that "ongoing administrative proceedings
before the Secretary of the Interior were aborted" by the district
court order.' 0
Uncertainty about the implications of this oblique support for the
new policy was resolved in two subsequent cases. The Global Explo-
ration and Development Corporation brought an action against the
Secretary' 0 2 in a factual situation almost identical to the Kerr-
McGee case: plaintiff sought to compel issuance of phosphate leases
for which they had applied in 1971 and 1972. However, because the
U.S. Geological Survey had not certified the discovery of a valuable
deposit, the Corporation's position was weaker than that of Kerr-
McGee. Nevertheless, the court refused to order issuance of the leases
and gave full support to the view of the moderates:
While NEPA does not grant the Secretary of the Interior discretion
in issuing leases once the Secretary has determined that valuable
deposits of phosphate exist within the lands for which the leases are
sought, it does command the Secretary to consider NEPA in making
a determination of the existence of valuable deposits.
100. Personal communication with Assistant Solicitor of the Department of the Interior,
Robert Uram, February 1978.
101. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Kleppe, et al., No. 76-608 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd. per
curiam sub nom. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Andrus, Nos. 77-1478 and 77-1483 (D.C.C.
1978), cert. denied, slip op. (U.S. Sup. Ct. October 2, 1978).
102. Global Exploration and Development Corporation v. Andrus, mem., No. 78-0642
(D.C. Cir. August 14, 1978).
July 1979]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
The Secretary is bound to interpret the command of 30 U.S.C. 187
to set lease terms ". . . for the protection of the interest of the
United States and ... for the safeguarding of the public welfare" in
the light of NEPA's stated goals and procedures. 1 0 3
The courts were not more receptive to the environmentalists' posi-
tion in the debate than they were to industry's view. The Global
Exploration case, in fact, virtually reiterated an earlier holding in a
case brought by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). In
Natural Resources Defense Council, In., v. Berklund'04 plaintiffs
sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that the Secre-
tary has discretion, under the Mineral Leasing Act and section 102(1)
of NEPA, to reject preference-right lease applications on environ-
mental grounds. Adopting much of the reasoning of the internal
debate on the matter, the court rejected NRDC's arguments, con-
cluding: "Given the unequivocal statutory language and the support-
ing legislative history, as well as 58 years of consistent agency statu-
tory interpretation and application, the court finds that 'shall' does
in fact mean 'shall' and does not permit the Secretary to reject
preference-right coal leases on purely environmental grounds."' '
Thus, the environmentalists' position in the debate was not con-
vincing to internal decision-makers or the courts. NRDC has, how-
ever, pursued other litigation that challenges, albeit indirectly, the
new regulations. In NRDC v. Hughes," 0 6 challenging the first coal-
leasing programmatic impact statement released in 1975, NRDC suc-
ceeded in having restrictions imposed on preference-right leasing even
after the 1976 regulations were promulgated. The implication of this
outcome was that NRDC, beyond the improved environmental pro-
tection possibilities of the marketability test, opposed preference-
right leasing in the absence of an acceptable EIS on the federal
coal-leasing program.
NRDC and the Interior Department negotiated a settlement early
in 1978 to allow the Department to process, but not award, up to 20
of the nearly 190 pending coal-lease applications.' 0I Clearly, this
development hampers the free operation of the commercial-quanti-
ties regulations. However, the Hughes suit was directed at the coal-
leasing program as a whole and not at the inherent soundness of the
marketability test. In addition, the suit does not affect noncompeti-
tive leasing of other minerals such as phosphate.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978).
105. Id., at 935.
106. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1977).
107. PUB. LAND NEWS, March 9,1978, at 1-2.
[Vol. 19
DEBATE WITHIN AND DEBATE WITHOUT
It is perhaps surprising that environmental groups, to the extent
that they were involved, rejected social balancing and appeared to
some extent to embrace marketability. Nevertheless, this appears to
be the case. The efforts of the Director of the Office of Policy
Analysis to involve the NRDC on his side of the debate failed. He
attributes his lack of success in building support for what was re-
garded within the Department as an extreme environmentalist view
to problems of communication between lawyers and economists.
Both Mineral Branch and NRDC attorneys were, in his view, equally
comfortable with the idea that appropriate lease stipulations prop-
erly enforced would result in environmental protection and equally
ill-equipped to respond positively to the concept of social balancing
and the lack of clear criteria which they believed that implies. The
Director summarized his problem in communicating with both
groups of lawyers as follows: "It wasn't that I was a flaming environ-
mentalist, it was that I was a goddamn economist." Moreover, the
social-balancing approach-although in this instance arguably the
"most environmentally oriented"-is not always that way. Many
environmentalists do not accept the fundamental premise of social
balancing that economic profit is commensurate with environmental
damage for purposes of balancing. The balancing test would condone
environmental damage if the value of the deposit were high enough
or the worth of the amenities preserved "low" enough. Both the
process and the result were intuitively distasteful to advocates who
held that environmental quality is unique or priceless and hence not
subject to quantification or comparative manipulation within an
analytic framework.' 0 I
Beyond industry and environmentalists, the 1976 regulations have
survived the scrutiny of yet another set of critics-those who arrived
with the Carter Administration. The new team took office in Jan-
uary, 1977, just a year after the Ford Administration had announced
a new coal leasing of which the commercial-quantities regulations
were an important element.
President Carter, in his May, 1977, environmental message, cast
the critical eye of the social-balancing advocate and asked the De-
partment to review the legal grounds on which the commercial-
quantities regulations had been built. Specifically, the new Adminis-
tration wanted to take another look at the possibility that the Secre-
tary might indeed have the discretion to deny environmentally
unacceptable preference-right lease applications. The Solicitor's
Office retracted the debate yet another time but could find no
108. See note 87 supra.
July 1979) 533
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
reason to alter the previous findings. It was their conclusion that,
after
carefully reassessing the basis for granting or denying preference
right leases . . . , no authority exists to change the interpretation set
forth in current departmental regulations. In brief, the Secretary has
a duty to issue a lease to a qualified applicant, but such duty does
not arise until the Secretary is satisfied that all laws and regulations,
including NEPA, have been met .... 109
CONCLUSIONS
NEPA and the EIS requirement comprise a critical part of the
environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The history of
that movement suggests a number of reasons why the external model
of administrative reform would dominate implementation of the stat-
ute: residue of confrontation tactics and distrust of government
agencies stemming from the Vietnam War protests; general post-
Watergate cynicism; and activism in the courts resulting from re-
duced deference to agency discretion, less arduous standing to sue
requirments, and the proliferation of environmental statutes to inter-
pret. Elaboration of NEPA constitutes one of the most sustained and
frequently analyzed administrative reform efforts in our nation's his-
tory.
After nearly a decade of litigation, however, a reassessment of the
external model-its tactical and analytical utility-seems appropriate.
Environmental problems are increasingly recognized as too complex
to be caused by mere administrative failure or to be resolved by even
the most efficacious bureaucracy. The costs of confrontation and
litigation are high both in dollar terms and in terms of effort that
could be more constructively employed. These weaknesses in the
operation of the external model, as a guide to analysis and action, are
becoming increasingly apparent. Awareness has perhaps been has-
tened by the recent appointment of numerous prominent environ-
mental activists to high government positions. In the present case,
when the outsiders came inside, they could find no reason to alter the
conclusions of the previous insiders' reforms. NEPA emerges from
this analysis as a useful tool and resource for progressive and environ-
mentally and politically sensitive Interior officials rather than as a
necessary prod or bludgeon.
There is a lesson to be learned from changing interpretations of
the Mineral Leasing Act under NEPA. Progress in environmental pro-
109. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925 (quotation from
Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs Response) (D.D.C. 1978).
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tection was not made by focusing attention on writing and reviewing
impact statements. Meaningful reform was achieved by altering the
underlying premises of decisions. This kind of reform cannot result
from efforts which begin with the assumption that executive agencies
lack diversity, sensitivity, and insight. Agencies contain interest
groups and interactions of their own, and the range of views present
on the inside can be fully reflective of that without.' 10 This aspect
of bureaucratic reality has been insufficiently treated in academic
literature on the subject and inadequately considered in the tactics
and rhetoric of the environmental movement. There are limits to
how far a study of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 can be general-
ized. However, the present inquiry suggests that both students and
would-be reformers of the administrative process have much to gain
from closer attention to and fuller appreciation of the creative poten-
tial of public agencies.
110. The authors are grateful to David Lindgren, Frederick N. Ferguson, William Moffat,
Robert Uram, Helen Ingram, Gail L. Achterman, Donald Buder, and Margaret Shannon for
their generosity in providing information, references, and suggestions for this analysis.
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